Expert Says Sudan’s Warring Parties Are Turning South Sudan’s Oil Into Political Leverage
An oil researcher warns that the country’s export lifeline runs through rival zones of control. Industry sources describe a US$4/US$7 transit-fee split; the agreements and transfers have not been published.
JUBA — South Sudan’s oil reaches the Red Sea through facilities and pipelines in war-torn Sudan. Tag Elkhazin, an adjunct professor at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, told Radio Tamazuj that Sudan’s warring parties can use access to those exports for political and financial leverage. The structural dependency is real; the precise terms of the alleged payments require further documentation.
oil fields
processing and transit
pipelines
export terminals
Illustrative route, not a map of field boundaries, present military deployments or pipeline engineering.
The reported transit-fee split
Sudan Tribune reported on 27 September, citing oil-industry sources, that roughly US$4 per South Sudanese barrel goes to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for passage through territory it controls and US$7 goes to Sudan’s army-aligned government. It described this as a division of the earlier US$11 transit tariff. The original agreement, invoices, bank transfers and South Sudanese treasury records have not been published with that account. The figures are therefore a sourced report, not an independently audited payment ledger.
Elkhazin separately told Radio Tamazuj that US$4 goes to the RSF and about US$6 to the Sudanese army, citing people he described as insiders. The US$1 discrepancy is unresolved; South Sudan Press uses the US$4/US$7 split only when attributing it to Sudan Tribune’s industry sources.
Why Heglig matters
The RSF seized the Heglig area in December 2025. South Sudan then deployed troops to protect the oil installations under a three-party arrangement involving Juba and Sudan’s rival forces, according to Sudan Tribune’s account of the military announcement. Heglig is a crucial processing and transit point. Sudan’s infrastructure carries South Sudanese crude onward to Red Sea export terminals.
That arrangement illustrates Juba’s difficult position: it needs oil to move through facilities exposed to a war it does not control. If transit stops, public revenue and the government’s ability to fund salaries and services are at risk. Dependence alone does not prove every political motive ascribed to either Sudanese faction.
Claims requiring verification
Elkhazin also alleged that Juba received US$20 million in cash from RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, that the RSF received two crude cargoes of about 600,000 barrels each, and that roughly 450 RSF personnel are near Juba. Radio Tamazuj said it could not independently verify the cash or cargo claims. South Sudan Press has not verified those allegations or the alleged troop presence. They must not be treated as established facts.
Any examination of those claims needs documents and on-record responses from the Presidency, Petroleum and Finance ministries, Nilepet, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, the RSF and Sudan’s army-aligned authorities. Claims about dredging and flooding require the purported July 2022 expert report and a separate environmental investigation.
The public-accountability test
Officials should publish the legal basis for transit payments, identify the counterparties, disclose how each fee is recorded and show the net oil revenue reaching South Sudan’s treasury. The public also needs a contingency plan for another closure. A more diverse economy and credible alternative export options would reduce the cost of dependence, but neither can be built overnight.
Questions still open
- Does Juba confirm the US$4/US$7 division, and who approved it?
- What contractual or security obligation authorises each payment, and who receives it?
- Can treasury, lifting and shipping records substantiate or disprove the alleged cash and cargo transfers?
- What verified security arrangements, if any, cover foreign personnel near Juba?
- How much net oil revenue reached the treasury in September, and what happens if the pipeline closes?
Sources: Sudan Tribune, 27 September 2026; Radio Tamazuj, 3 October 2026; Sudan Tribune, December 2025; Carleton University profile.