South Sudan at the Crossroads: Industrialisation, the University of Juba and the Politics of Oil Dependency
Opinion: The arguments and policy recommendations are the author’s. South Sudan Press checked the institutional descriptions and figures cited below. The trade minister is described by her current caretaker title; the fibre project’s financing remains unclear.
South Sudan has resources, a young population and a location connecting East African markets. Yet conflict, a narrow production base and dependence on crude oil have left the country exposed to events beyond its control. The question is whether leaders will invest in the people and institutions needed to make goods and create jobs—or continue to depend on oil receipts to finance government.
The University of Juba as an industrial engine
The University of Juba’s School of Applied and Industrial Sciences teaches fields that could serve local production, including food science, industrial chemistry, biotechnology, electronics and instrumentation. The separate School of Mathematics develops analytical skills that industry, engineering and finance also need. The university’s published programme list confirms these fields. It would be inaccurate to combine the two under a single “School of Mathematics and Physics.”
On 12 February 2026, the university and UNESCO broke ground for a technical and vocational training facility supporting a food science and technology diploma. The university says it is intended to strengthen food processing, quality, safety and agricultural value chains, with African Development Bank support. A groundbreaking is a beginning; the measure of success will be an equipped, functioning facility, trained students and links to producers.
These investments should be matched with reliable electricity, laboratories, industrial placements and seed finance. Graduates cannot build an agro-processing sector on credentials alone. They need an environment where a prototype can become a firm, a firm can borrow, and a producer can move goods safely to market.
Oil revenues and the test of public priorities
The African Development Bank’s 2026 country report describes oil as about 95% of exports and 70–80% of government budget revenues. Those estimates differ from other years and measures; no single percentage should be presented as permanent. The disruption of exports through Sudan demonstrated how easily public finances can be shaken.
Oil dependence is also a governance question. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan estimated at least $25.2 billion in oil-related inflows since 2011, adjusted to December 2024 dollars and alleged that an estimated $2.2 billion went through the off-budget Oil for Roads programme. These are the Commission’s findings, which South Sudanese officials have disputed. They warrant transparent accounts, independent audits and public debate, not an assumption that every dollar was available for industrial spending.
The South Sudan Development Plan for 2026–2036 states an ambition to build a more productive and resilient economy. A plan becomes meaningful only when it appears in annual budgets, audited disbursements, functioning infrastructure and measurable jobs. I would start with agricultural processing, repair and fabrication, and energy services that meet immediate domestic demand.
Trade leadership needs institutions behind it
Dr. Labanya Margaret Mathya took office at the Ministry of Trade and Industry in May 2026. As of October, official Ugandan reporting still identifies her as South Sudan’s minister, and ministry communications describe her as caretaker minister. She should therefore not be called a former or previous minister.
At a Horn of Africa Initiative trade consultation, she argued for digital trade processes and regional integration. The ministry has also discussed barriers faced by traders, road access and electronic services. These are promising priorities, but a minister cannot alone supply electricity, reform bank lending, end informal fees and guarantee contract enforcement. Policy continuity across ministries and a practical agreement with the private sector matter more than any one appointment.
Long-term industrial policy requires the presidency, finance and trade ministries, central bank, universities and businesses to agree on a few measurable goals. Each should have a responsible institution, a budget and a published progress report. Constant changes in office make that coordination harder.
Finance is the missing bridge
The AfDB describes a shallow financial system and limited credit for productive firms. Banks cannot confidently finance machinery and inventory when savings mobilisation is weak, cash is scarce, contract enforcement is uncertain and borrowers lack acceptable collateral. Digital payments can make transactions easier, but they cannot substitute for trust, sound supervision and stable money.
The first steps should be stronger bank oversight, a usable credit information system, movable-asset collateral rules and fair ways to resolve commercial disputes. Mobile money and agent banking can extend access beyond Juba, provided networks, interoperability and consumer protection improve. A proposed industrial development fund should publish every recipient, terms and repayment performance; without that discipline it could reproduce the weaknesses of earlier off-budget schemes.
Innovation requires speed and scrutiny
South Sudan needs dependable connectivity, but the cost and financing of a national fibre backbone require careful scrutiny. Some reporting described an allocation above $9 billion; a separate ministerial account in 2025 described a $67 million project with $9.3 million for design. These may refer to different scopes, currencies or reporting errors. Until the approved budget and contracts are public, I would not treat the $9 billion figure as a settled project cost.
Fibre alone will not make an industrial economy. A technician needs power to run equipment; a farmer needs storage and roads; an entrepreneur needs a predictable licence and affordable capital. The pace that matters is the pace at which those parts begin working together.
What should happen next?
Government and industry
- Publish a costed industrial programme under the 2026–2036 plan, beginning with food processing, light manufacturing and maintenance services.
- Give the University of Juba’s applied science programmes recurring laboratory and research support, with transparent procurement and published outcomes.
- Set measurable targets for electricity, road access, trade clearance and the removal of informal charges.
- Publish oil-revenue allocations and audit industrial and infrastructure spending.
Financial institutions
- Strengthen bank supervision and credit information before expanding subsidised industrial lending.
- Develop movable-collateral rules so viable firms can borrow against equipment or inventory.
- Expand interoperable digital payments and rural agents while protecting users and preserving cash access.
University of Juba
- Build industrial placements and entrepreneurship into applied-science programmes.
- Create an industry liaison office to connect researchers with farms, processors and small manufacturers.
- Publish a practical research agenda and seek competitive, independently assessed grants.
South Sudan’s oil is finite and its route to market is vulnerable. Its young people, by contrast, can create value for decades if the country invests in their skills and the institutions that put those skills to work. The University of Juba has started to build capacity. The state must now make that capacity useful to the wider economy.